<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=windows-1252"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">I don't argue against the urgency. I argue for a strategy; some things come first more easily than others.<div><br></div><div>Getting the supes to pass such an ordinance is one thing. Making a success of actually making such an ordinance a success if complicated and laden with traps.</div><div><br></div><div>The powers-that-be, of course, don't want power decentralized.</div><div><br></div><div>Here are some webpages I'm researching now:</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule</a></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule#Home_rule_within_the_50_states">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule#Home_rule_within_the_50_states</a></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule_in_the_United_States">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_rule_in_the_United_States</a></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/home+rule">http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/home+rule</a></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://www.celdf.org/downloads/Home Rule State or Dillons Rule State.pdf">http://www.celdf.org/downloads/Home%20Rule%20State%20or%20Dillons%20Rule%20State.pdf</a></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><br></div></div></blockquote><span style="font-family: GillSans;">I see that I'll also have to study up on Dillon's Rule, too:</span><br><blockquote style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><br></div><div style="font-family: GillSans;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forrest_Dillon#Dillon.27s_Rule">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forrest_Dillon#Dillon.27s_Rule</a></div></div><div><br></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div><div>On Nov 18, 2014, at 7:39 PM, <a href="mailto:agnes@mcn.org">agnes@mcn.org</a> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite">Lanny,<br>If you will remember the email from Ben forwarded by Shannon, you will<br>realize the urgency we of the MCPB Coalition are concerned about and why<br>we think urging three Supervisors to pass an ordinance to set up a County<br>Public Bank before our local county funds are stripped by W.S. Banks and<br>we are Detroitized.<br>Here's the original email:<br><br> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------<br><blockquote type="cite">Subject: [CRNMC] FW: Preparing To Asset-strip Local Government? The Fedąs<br>Bizarre New Rules<br>From: "Shannon Biggs" <<a href="mailto:shannon@globalexchange.org">shannon@globalexchange.org</a>><br>Date: Wed, September 10, 2014 11:11 am<br>To: "Community Rights Network" <<a href="mailto:crn@lists.mcn.org">crn@lists.mcn.org</a>><br>--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br><br>Shared by Ben, his thoughts and the link are below.<br><br>Blessings to all, looking forward to the point person call tomorrow.<br><br>Best, Shannon<br>------ Forwarded Message<br><br><br><br>Folks,<br><br>A common concern expressed by municipal officials and their hired attorneys<br>when they ask about the possible consequences of enacting community bills<br>of<br>rights banning state-permitted corporate activities is this: standing up<br>for the rights of community residents against corporate interests could<br>result in the bankruptcy of the municipality due to legal fees and damages<br>won for "violating" corporate civil rights. It's reason #1 for their<br>rejection of local bans on corporate harm-for-profit projects. Those<br>officials are probably not noticing that the bankruptcy they fear is<br>already<br>being planned for them and their tax-paying constituents even without the<br>corporate lawsuits for doing what government is supposed to do: secure<br>unalienable rights.<br><br>So, here's a current economics lesson for them and for us (see article<br>below). Here is more evidence of the new enclosures. The privatization of<br>the "commons" -- which are our social assets held in-common -- can be seen<br>everywhere, from the defunding and planned failure of school systems,<br>public<br>pensions, state and national parks, municipal utilities, to the take-over<br>of<br>municipalities like Detroit, MI; Harrisburg, PA and the stripping of local<br>government by centralization of governing authority....the new enclosures<br>look a lot like stealth fascism.<br><br>Ben<br><br>Why would regulators dangerously jeopardize state and local government<br>budgets in this way? Skeptical observers speculate that the intent is to<br>Detroit-ize municipal governments, so that assets can be stripped as is<br>being done in that imperiled city. The international bankers got away with<br>asset-stripping Greece. Why not make the US itself a wholly-owned<br>subsidiary<br>of private banking interests?<br><br><br><a href="http://ellenbrown.com/2014/09/08/preparing-to-asset-strip-local-government-t">http://ellenbrown.com/2014/09/08/preparing-to-asset-strip-local-government-t</a><br>he-feds-bizarre-new-rules/<br><br>Preparing To Asset-strip Local Government? The Fedąs Bizarre New Rules<br><<br>http://ellenbrown.com/2014/09/08/preparing-to-asset-strip-local-government-<br>the-feds-bizarre-new-rules/><br>Posted on September 8, 2014 by Ellen Brown<br>In an inscrutable move that has alarmed state treasurers, the Federal<br>Reserve, along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the<br>Office<br>of the Comptroller of the Currency, just changed the liquidity requirements<br>for the nationąs largest banks. Municipal bonds, long considered safe<br>liquid<br>investments, have been eliminated from the list of high-quality liquid<br>collateral. assets (HQLA). That means banks that are the largest holders of<br>munis are liable to start dumping them in favor of the Treasuries and<br>corporate bonds that do satisfy the requirement.<br>Muni bonds fund the nationąs critical infrastructure, and they are subject<br>to the whims of the market: as demand goes down, interest rates must be<br>raised to attract buyers. State and local governments could find themselves<br>in the position of cash-strapped Eurozone states, subject to crippling<br>interest rates. The starkest example is Greece, where rates went as high as<br>30% when investors feared the governmentąs insolvency. Sky-high interest<br>rates, in turn, are the fast track to insolvency. Greece wound up stripped<br>of its assets, which were privatized at fire sale prices in a futile<br>attempt<br>to keep up with the bills.<br>The first major hit to US municipal bonds occurred with the downgrade of<br>two<br>major monoline insurers in January 2008. The fault was with the insurers,<br>but the taxpayers footed the bill. The downgrade signaled a simultaneous<br>downgrade of bonds<br><<br>http://www.globalresearch.ca/credit-default-swaps-evolving-financial-meltdo<br>wn-and-derivative-disaster-du-jour/8634> from over 100,000 municipalities<br>and institutions, totaling more than $500 billion. The Fedąs latest rule<br>change could be the final nail in the municipal bond coffin, another<br>misguided move by regulators that not only does not hit its mark but<br>results<br>in serious collateral damage to local governments maybe serious<br></blockquote>enough to<br><blockquote type="cite">finally propel them into bankruptcy.<br>Why this unprecedented move by US regulators? It is not because municipal<br>bonds are too risky, since corporate bonds with lower credit ratings are<br>accepted under the new rules. Nor is it that the stricter standard is<br>required by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the<br>BIS-based<br>global regulator agreed to by the G20 leaders in 2009. The Basel III<br>Accords<br>set by the BCBS are actually more lenient than the US rules and do not<br>include these HQLA requirements. So whatąs going on?<br><blockquote type="cite">From the Inscrutable, Unaccountable Fed<br></blockquote>The rule change was detailed by Pam Martens and Russ Martens in a September<br>4th article titled łThe Fed Just Imposed Financial Austerity on the States<br><<br><a href="http://wallstreetonparade.com/2014/09/the-fed-just-imposed-financial-auster">http://wallstreetonparade.com/2014/09/the-fed-just-imposed-financial-auster</a><br>ity-on-the-states/> .˛ They write that on September 3rd:<br><blockquote type="cite">The Federal regulators adopted a new rule that requires the countryąs<br></blockquote>largest<br><blockquote type="cite">banks those with $250 billion or more in total assets to hold an<br></blockquote>increased<br><blockquote type="cite">level of newly defined łhigh quality liquid assets˛ (HQLA) in order to<br></blockquote>meet a<br><blockquote type="cite">potential run on the bank during a credit crisis. In addition to U.S.<br></blockquote>Treasury<br><blockquote type="cite">securities and other instruments backed by the full faith and credit of<br></blockquote>the<br><blockquote type="cite">U.S. government (agency debt), the regulators have included some dubious<br>instruments while shunning others with a higher safety profile.<br>Bizarrely, the Fed and its regulatory siblings included investment grade<br>corporate bonds, the majority of which do not trade on an exchange, and<br></blockquote>more<br><blockquote type="cite">stunningly, stocks in the Russell 1000, as meeting the definition of high<br>quality liquid assets, while excluding all municipal bonds even<br></blockquote></blockquote>general<br><blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite">obligation municipal bonds from states with a far higher credit standing<br></blockquote>and<br><blockquote type="cite">safety profile than BBB-rated corporate bonds.<br>This, rightfully, has state treasurers in an uproar. The five largest<br></blockquote>Wall<br><blockquote type="cite">Street banks control the majority of deposits in the country. By<br></blockquote>disqualifying<br><blockquote type="cite">municipal bonds from the category of liquid assets, the biggest banks are<br>likely to trim back their holdings in munis which could raise the cost or<br>limit the ability for states, counties, cities and school districts to<br></blockquote>issue<br><blockquote type="cite">muni bonds to build schools, roads, bridges and other infrastructure<br></blockquote>needs.<br><blockquote type="cite">This is a particularly strange position for a Fed that is worried about<br></blockquote>subpar<br><blockquote type="cite">economic growth.<br></blockquote>Not Sufficiently Liquid?<br>In a September 3rd press release<br><<br><a href="http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/tarullo-statement-2014">http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/tarullo-statement-2014</a><br>0903.htm> , Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K. Tarullo stated that while<br>łmost state and municipal bonds are not sufficiently liquid to serve the<br>purposes of HQLA in stressed periods . . . the liquidity of some state and<br>municipal bonds is comparable to that of the very liquid corporate bonds<br>that can qualify as HQLA.˛ [Cite] Criteria were being developed, he said,<br>for considering these assets. But łit is important to get this final rule<br>adopted now, so that the largest banks can begin to prepare for its<br>implementation on January 1.˛ In the meantime, muni bonds are in limbo,<br></blockquote>and<br><blockquote type="cite">it appears that most will still not be accepted as HQLA.<br>The regulators consider stocks to be more liquid than muni bonds because<br>they are readily traded on the stock market. But as the Martensą note,<br>stock<br>markets can be quite inaccessible in a crisis. Quoting from the Fedąs own<br>archives on the crash of 1987:<br><blockquote type="cite">Market makers in the over-the-counter market were not obligated to<br></blockquote>maintain an<br><blockquote type="cite">orderly market and many withdrew from trading. Delays in processing<br></blockquote>trades<br><blockquote type="cite">resulted in investors receiving prices very different from what they<br></blockquote>expected.<br><blockquote type="cite">Many brokers did not answer their phones, leaving investors unable to<br></blockquote>reach<br><blockquote type="cite">them. Erratic price movements and quotes resulted in frequent lock-ups<br></blockquote>in the<br><blockquote type="cite">electronic trading system used in the over-the-counter market.<br></blockquote>In any case, switching the banksą holdings from muni bonds to corporate<br>bonds or Treasuries is liable to have little effect in a crash. The<br>stricter<br>rules are supposed to be a defense against bank runs; but in a major<br>derivatives bust and bail-in, the available collateral will go first to the<br>derivatives claimants, through a massive concession to financial<br>institutions in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005. (See my earlier article<br>here<br><<br><a href="http://ellenbrown.com/2013/04/09/winner-takes-all-the-super-priority-status">http://ellenbrown.com/2013/04/09/winner-takes-all-the-super-priority-status</a><br>-of-derivatives/> .) The FDIC and the depositors are both liable to be out<br>of luck, no matter what form the collateral takes.<br>The Martensą conclude:<br><blockquote type="cite">That the Fed and its regulatory cohorts have to resort to this<br></blockquote>implausible<br><blockquote type="cite">plan which crimps the ability of states and localities to raise<br></blockquote>essential<br><blockquote type="cite">funds to operate in a strained effort to pretend that theyąve found a<br></blockquote>means<br><blockquote type="cite">of avoiding another massive bailout of Wall Street in a crisis, is just<br>further proof that the only way to seriously deal with too-big-to-fail<br></blockquote>banks<br><blockquote type="cite">is to restore the Glass-Steagall Act and break up these complex creatures<br>before they strike again.<br></blockquote>Gordon Gekko Goes Muni?<br>The rule change may not have much effect in a crash, but where it will have<br>a major effect is on the cost of credit, which will increase for municipal<br>governments and decrease for corporate and financial institutions. The<br>result will be to further shift power and financial resources from the<br>public sector to the private sector.<br>Why would regulators dangerously jeopardize state and local government<br>budgets in this way? Skeptical observers speculate that the intent is to<br>Detroit-ize municipal governments, so that assets can be stripped as is<br>being done in that imperiled city. The international bankers got away with<br>asset-stripping Greece. Why not make the US itself a wholly-owned<br>subsidiary<br>of private banking interests?<br>If that seems far-fetched, consider what is happening with Argentina<br><<br>http://ellenbrown.com/2014/08/25/colonization-by-bankruptcy-the-high-stakes<br>-chess-match-for-argentina/> , which has been forced into bankruptcy by a<br>US<br>court to satisfy the exaggerated claims of certain hold-out vulture funds.<br>IMF regulators have discussed establishing an international bankruptcy<br>court<br>that could strip a country such as Argentina of its assets, including prime<br>sections of real estate, to pay off the nationąs creditors.<br>In the US, there is already a trend to force state and municipal<br>governments<br>into austerity measures, if not outright bankruptcy, in order to eliminate<br>labor unions, pension obligations and social services. Bankruptcies can be<br>involuntary, forced by the creditors who caused them. Detroit is the US<br>model <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/bank-j10.html> .<br>Michiganąs Constitution protects pensions, so the emergency manager<br>appointed by the governor could not unilaterally cut those funds. But in a<br>municipal bankruptcy, a judge would decide the fate of city workersą<br>pensions, making it an attractive option for banking interests. The<br>oligarchs have long had their eyes on the massive sums represented by the<br>pension funds.<br>Public Banks to the Rescue?<br>Whatever the explanation for the Fedąs game-changing move, the<br>vulnerability<br>of state and local governments to unpredictable and unaccountable federal<br>regulators is another strong argument in favor of forming publicly-owned<br>banks. Why be under the thumb of an erratic privately-owned central bank<br>manipulated by Wall Street megabanks now caught in multiple frauds?<br>Like Eurozone countries, US states cannot print their own currencies. But<br>unlike Eurozone countries, they can borrow from their own public banks,<br>which can create money as credit on their books just as private banks do.<br>At least, they could if they had their own banks. Only one state North<br>Dakota has currently taken advantage of that option. North Dakota is<br></blockquote>also<br><blockquote type="cite">the only state to have escaped the 2008 credit crisis, sporting a budget<br>surplus every year since then. It has the lowest unemployment rate in the<br>country, the lowest default rate on credit card debt, and one of the lowest<br>foreclosure rates.<br>True, North Dakota also has oil. But the 2008 crisis happened before oil<br>and<br>gas had made a significant impact<br><<a href="http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPND2&f=M">http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPND2&f=M</a>><br>on<br>state revenues; and the state was posting a budget surplus all during that<br>period. Other oil and gas states are not doing so well.<br>Globally, 40% of banks are publicly owned; and they are largely in the BRIC<br>countries Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries also escaped<br>the credit crisis largely unscathed.<br>If state and municipal governments want to protect themselves from the fate<br>of Greece and Detroit, they would do well to follow North Dakotaąs lead<br></blockquote>and<br><blockquote type="cite">form their own publicly-owned banks. And time is of the essence, if they<br>hope to beat the rush before the first US Cyprus-style bail-in consumes the<br>collateral<br><<br><a href="http://ellenbrown.com/2013/04/09/winner-takes-all-the-super-priority-status">http://ellenbrown.com/2013/04/09/winner-takes-all-the-super-priority-status</a><br>-of-derivatives/> that local governments are counting on to protect their<br>multi-billions in deposits.<br>_________<br>Ellen Brown is an attorney, founder of the Public Banking Institute<br><http://publicbankinginstitute.org/> , and author of twelve books,<br>including<br>the best-selling Web of Debt <http://webofdebt.com/> . In The Public Bank<br>Solution <http://publicbanksolution.com/> , her latest book, she explores<br>successful public banking models historically and globally. Her 200+ blog<br>articles are at EllenBrown.com <http://ellenbrown.com/> .<br><br><br><br>------ End of Forwarded Message<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>crn mailing list<br>crn@lists.mcn.org<br>http://lists.mcn.org/mailman/options/crn<br><br></blockquote><br>Attachments:<br>untitled-[2].html <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>25 k <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span>[ text/html ] <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre"> </span> Download | View<br>Delete & Prev | Unread & Prev | Unread & Next | Delete & Next<br><br><br><br><blockquote type="cite">I'm all in favor of a Mendo Public Bank and Coalition. I'll join! But<br>strategically, I think the banking issue should come AFTER we become a<br>Home Rule County. Libertarians and some Teapartiers will understand a<br>Charter County sooner than they will jump on the bandwagon of a public<br>bank.<br><br>Just sayin',<br><br>Lanny<br><br><br>On Nov 18, 2014, at 1:43 PM, <a href="mailto:bodhirobin@pacific.net">bodhirobin@pacific.net</a> wrote:<br><br><blockquote type="cite">I welcome you all to join the Mendocino County Public Banking Coalition<br>in which we have been pushing for "home rule" for 2 1/2 years/<br><br>Karina said, "Where do I sign up?" I see that I have invited Karina to<br>the MCPBC long ago, but the invitation was never answered. You can read<br>more about it and see the draft county charter #14 on the MCPBC Facebook<br>page.<br><a href="https://www.facebook.com/MendoPublicBankCoalition?ref=br_tf">https://www.facebook.com/MendoPublicBankCoalition?ref=br_tf</a><br><br>Thank you, Charles, for these fine definitions and explanations from<br>Black's Law Dictionary. We already have 2 advocates on the Board of<br>Supervisors in favor of a county charter, Hamburg and Gjerde. Brown and<br>Pinches are against it, but Pinches will soon be gone. McCowen says he<br>is not opposed to it, but wants to see a better charter. And a member<br>of our Coalition is educating Tom Woodhouse who finds the concept<br>"interesting." If the vote count at the end of the month decides<br>Madrigal won the race for District 3, she will be the 3rd vote we need<br>to get the charter on the ballot.<br><br>We need your help in convincing Supervisors to place the charter on the<br>ballot.<br>We need money to pay a lawyer to scrutinize the draft charter for<br>inconsistencies and gross errors. We expect to be doing a fundraiser<br>soon like the Jeff Clements event, to raise the money, but we first need<br>to engage a famous speaker with public draw. Can you suggest someone?<br><br>Thanks for your interest!<br>Many of us from the MCPBC helped make Measure S law. Now the CRNMC can<br>help the MCPBC make Mendocino into a Charter County.<br><br>Attached please find page 17 of our PowerPoint presentation.<br><br>In Peace, Robin<br><br><br><br>Some Comments On Home Rule from Charles Cresson Wood<br><br>Hello CRNMC friends,<br><br>Since I mentioned it in a post to this listserv several days back,<br>several people have asked me to provide more information about "home<br>rule counties." This email attempts to do that. I am not an expert on<br>the matter -- just a law school student investigating this possibility.<br>Perhaps becoming a home rule county is an appropriate next step for the<br>CRNMC?<br><br>Black's Law Dictionary (1990 edition) defines "home rule" as a state<br>constitutional provision or legislative action providing city or county<br>government with a greater measure of self-government. The basic document<br>used to carry on the function of home rule is the "home rule charter." A<br>home rule charter is an organizational plan or framework for a municipal<br>corporation, analogous to a constitution of a state or nation, and again<br>it is drawn by the municipality itself and adopted by popular vote of<br>its people (Black's Law Dictionary). Such a home rule charter gives an<br>affirmative grant of power to a city or county to manage its own<br>affairs, it can be used to transfer portions of state power to local<br>government. Home rule charters give city or county governments a fair<br>amount of autonomy from state control, and have been used to keep the<br>state out of the day-to-day operations of local government units.<br>California adopted a constitutional provision granting the possibility<br>of home rule to counties, and was the first state to do so; all that<br>happening back in 1911. [History buffs will note this follows on the<br>heels of the height of the populist movement around 1890-1900.]<br><br>A home rule charter is interesting because it can provide additional<br>powers to our local government to accomplish the following:<br><br>(1) Enhanced Environmental Regulation: provide additional ability to<br>regulate the environment and the ways in which business is affecting the<br>environment. Counties in Colorado are using home rule county powers to<br>regulate fracking. (See an article entitled "Local Government Fracking<br>Regulations: A Colorado Case Study," appearing in the Stanford<br>Environmental Law Journal, in January 2014.) We may need additional<br>local regulations to effectively control fracking and other detrimental<br>industrial processes, such as preventing toxic pesticides from getting<br>into our wells and surface waters.<br><br>(2) Adopt Powers of the State: By becoming a charter county, a<br>California county can have its charter take on the force and effect of<br>state legislative enactment (state law). In other words, a county<br>charter is something more than a local ordinance and less than the<br>California Constitution. This can give it sovereign immunity in<br>California courts, so that some of its laws stand up, particularly when<br>challenges come from legal persons such as corporations. (See an article<br>entitled "California Counties: Second-Rate Localities or Ready-Made<br>Regional Governments", appearing in the Hastings Law Review in Spring<br>1999). We may need additional fortification against future legal<br>challenges coming from corporations.<br><br>(3) Immunity from State Control: The role of the state in preempting<br>local regulatory authority differs significantly between home rule and<br>non-home rule (general law) counties. For both, state constitutions<br>implicitly recognize the superior authority of the state to regulate<br>certain matters; in these matters the state may always preempt local<br>regulations. Home rule counties have an opportunity to adopt a more<br>active and definite role in their own governance than general law<br>counties (Mendocino is now a general law county). Home rule status, per<br>the California Constitution, Article XI, provision 5(a), authorizes<br>local government to preempt state law in the governing of municipal<br>affairs. Although the law is still evolving here, cases show that in<br>cases where a significant local interest is served, home rule counties<br>can preempt state law. Regulation of non-hazardous solid waste is one of<br>those areas deemed to be a matter of significant local concern. (See An<br>Assessment of the Role of Local Government in Environmental Regulation,<br>UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 1986.) Note that according<br>to the Wikipedia entry for "Home Rule," in California, Dillon's Rule<br>does not apply to home rule charter<br>cities (although this needs to be confirmed, it may also not apply to<br>home rule counties). We may need to, in the future, block certain<br>industry-friendly laws that the state seeks to impose on us.<br><br>(4) Handle Our Own Problems Expeditiously: Home rule counties can handle<br>their own problems as they take place, and they have been granted broad<br>powers to do so without going to the state legislature. Home rule thus<br>gives a city or county government great flexibility to deal effectively<br>with local needs and desires in its own ways. (See the article "Home<br>Rule Comes to Minnesota," appearing in the William Mitchell Law Review,<br>Vol. 19, issue 4, 1999.) One use of home rule charter is to provide for<br>a public bank. The city of Bolder Colorado has used its public bank to<br>build out a publicly-owned public utility. (See<br>http://coloradopublicbanking.blogspot.com/). Many other interesting<br>possibilities open up when public money is used for the good of the<br>people instead of the big banks. We may need the legal clout to<br>establish our own local and parallel financial system, so that the<br>existing corrupt financial system tied in with the Wall Street big banks<br>can collapse and go bankrupt, but our county will not be wiped out by<br>their implosion.<br><br>/s/ Charles<Map of CA charter<br>counties.pdf>_______________________________________________<br>crn mailing list<br>crn@lists.mcn.org<br>http://lists.mcn.org/mailman/options/crn<br></blockquote><br>_______________________________________________<br>crn mailing list<br><a href="mailto:crn@lists.mcn.org">crn@lists.mcn.org</a><br>http://lists.mcn.org/mailman/options/crn<br><br></blockquote><br><br><br>_______________________________________________<br>crn mailing list<br><a href="mailto:crn@lists.mcn.org">crn@lists.mcn.org</a><br>http://lists.mcn.org/mailman/options/crn<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></html>